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Washington5 for the rule that in order" [tlo prove a consti-
tutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defen-
dant must show both that his counsel's representation was
deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency:54In
applying Strickland, the court found that in none of the
challenged decisions was defense counsel deficient under
the Strickland standard. The court opined that Howard's
past prison record would have been a double-edged sword
with the jury, and that Howard's military and school records
"were, at best,'checkered." 5
V. Commentary on Defendant's Failure to Testify
Howard asserted that his Fifth Amendment 6 right
against self-incrimination was violated when the prosecu-
tor, in his closing remarks to the sentencing jury, repeatedly
asked:"Where is the remorse?" 57 Howard claimed that these
"466 U.S. 668 (1984).
"Howard, 131 E3d at 421 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
55Id.
S6No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or pub-
lic danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
statements were an impermissible commentary on his deci-
sion not to testify. The court of appeals disagreed, stating
that "when a prosecutor's comments are merely a 'fair
response to a claim made by a defendant or his counsel"
there is no constitutional violation"5 The court observed
that "those remarks were in direct response to defense
counsel's argument that Howard was remorseful for his
actions. The court concluded that the comments did not
violate Howard's Fifth Amendment rights.
5 9
Summary and analysis by:
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offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
U.S. Const. amend.V
57Howard, 131 E3d at 421 (quoting App. at 1612-13).
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FACTS
Randall Hill was killed on January 10, 1990, by three
bullets to the chest and abdomen. Eyewitness testimony
of defendant's wife (also victim's mother) and ballistics
evidence established that Zane Brown Hill ("Hill")
entered the residence of his estranged wife and son
armed with a rifle. Hill introduced evidence that on that
day he had ingested twelve beers, four Darvons, a pain
reliever, and two Flexorils, a muscle relaxant. Randall
Hill, who was in possession of a pistol, attempted to call
the police, but was shot and killed by Hill while in the
process of doing so. Hill then struck his wife with the
butt of the rifle.While he reloaded the rifle, his wife fled
the house. Neighbors testified that Hill shot at his flee-
ing wife but missed her.' Hill was charged and convict-
'State v. Hill, 417 S.E.2d 765,769-70 (N.C. 1992).
2North Carolina General Statute section 14-17 states in perti-
nent part:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of
poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or
ed of first-degree murder under North Carolina General
Statute section 14-17.2 He was sentenced to death under
North Carolina General Statute section 15A-2000.1
by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex
offense, robbery, kidnaping, burglary, or other felony
committed or attempted with the use of a deadly
weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first
degree, a Class A felony, and any person who commits
such murder shall be punished with death or imprison-
ment in the State's prison for life without parole as the
court shall determine pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000....
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1997).
3North Carolina General Statute section 15A-2000 states in perti-
nent part;with respect to the separate sentencing hearingthe following:
After hearing the evidence, argument of counsel
and instructions of the court, the jury shall deliberate
and render a sentence recommendation to the court,
based on the following matters:
(1)Whether any sufficient aggravating circumstance or
circumstances as enumerated in subsection (e) exist;
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Hill appealed the verdict and sentence to the North
Carolina Supreme Court.4 The court rejected Hill's assign-
ments of error which included impropriety in voir dire,
inadmissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, inadmissibility
of photographs of victim, and impropriety of jury instruc-
tions.' The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
6
Hill's petition for state habeas corpus also failed, and the
Court denied certiorari
7
In his petition for federal habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, Hill raised claims regarding 1) the trial judge's fail-
ure to recuse himself, 2) the prosecution's suppression of
exculpatory evidence, and 3) the trial counsel's ineffective
assistance of counsel.The habeas petition was denied and
Hill appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.8
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit found no Due Process Clause violation requiring the
recusal of the state court trial judge,9 no violation of Brady
v. Maryland 0 by the prosecution," and no ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.'
2
(2) Whether any sufficient mitigating circum-
stance or circumstances as enumerated in subsec-
tion (f), which outweigh the aggravating circum-
stance or circumstances found, exist; and
(3) Based on these considerations, whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death or to
imprisonment in the State's prison for life.
N.C. Gen Stat. § 15A-2000 (Michie 1997).
4MHil, 417 S.E.2d at 769.
51d. at 786.
6Hill v. North Carolina, 507 U.S. 924 (1993).
7State v. Hill, 459 S.E.2d 514 (N.C. 1995).
'Hill v. French, 133 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1997). Hill is an unpub-
lished disposition. According to Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36(c),
"citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for
establishing res judicata, estoppel. or the law of the case and
requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the
Fourth Circuit:The full opinion can be found at Hill v. French, No.
97-13,1997WL 787126 (4th Cir. Dec. 24,1997).All subsequent cita-
tions to Hill in this paper will use this electronic database citation.
9Hil 1997 WL 787126 at *1.
"0373 U.S. 83 (1962) (suppression by prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of
good faith or bad faith of prosecution).The court of appeals' opin-
ion gives no information about the nature of the alleged exculpa-
tory evidence, and neither does the North Carolina Supreme Court
opinion on Hill's direct appeal. State v. Hill, 417 S.E.2d 765 (N.C.
1992).The court of appeals found that the documents in question
were in fact not suppressed by the prosecutor. "The prosecutor
not only provided defense counsel with documents in her file and
made the file available, but literally opened up the file on her desk
and discussed its contents with defense counsel' Hill, 1997 WL
787126 at *2.
"Hill 1997WL 787126 at *2.
121d. at *2-4.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
L Recusal of the Trial Judge
Hill contended that the state judge should have recused
himself from hearing Hill's post conviction claims. Hill
asserted this claim to the court of appeals in order to estab-
lish that he was denied a "full, fair and adequate hearing""
in state court, and thus qualified for a new evidentiary hear-
ing in federal court, under the federal habeas corpus statute
in force at the time. 4
Hill based his recusal claim on two statements made by
the state court judge.The first statement was made in court,
in response to a request by Hill's trial counsel for appoint-
ment of new counsel for Hill's direct appeal. Hill asserted
that new counsel was necessary for him to pursue effec-
tively an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct
appeal. After denial of the request, the judge stated: "I saw
no reason during the course of the trial, from a personal
viewpoint, ... how that could be raised.""
The other statement in question made by the judge was
extrajudicial, made to an employee at a dry cleaning estab-
lishment after the conclusion of the trial. The employee
commented that she felt sorry for Hill, and the judge
responded: "Anybody that their family's happy to see them
get the death penalty got what they deserved'
6
"328 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 1994).
IId.
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by
an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a deter-
mination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue,
made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a pro-
ceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State
or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a
written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and ade-
quate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct,
unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise
appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not
resolved in the State court hearing;
(2) that the fact finding procedure employed by the
State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair
hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately devel-
oped at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter or over the person of the applicant in the
State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court,
in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint
counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and ade-
quate hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due
process of law in the State court proceeding;
"Hill, 1997WL 787126 at *1.
16Id.
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To the question of recusal in this case, the court of
appeals applied the standard used by the United States
Supreme Court in Liteky v. United States, 7 which held that
"opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts intro-
duced or events occurring in the course of... prior pro-
ceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality
motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." '
The court found that the standard used in Liteky did not
require the recusal of the trial judge in Hill's case. In a foot-
note, the court went on to explain that the Liteky court had
applied the standard- of the federal recusal statute applica-
ble to federal judges only. 9 Citing to United States v.
Couch,20 the court reasoned that although the proper stan-
dard a federal court must use in reviewing a recusal deci-
sion by a state court judge is the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, such standard is more difficult for
the petitioner to meet than the Liteky standard, and thus, if
the petitioner fails the latter standard, then he presump-
tively fails the former standard as well.2 The court held that
Hill did not meet the Liteky standard, and thus did not meet
the Due Process standard either.2
However, the court only cited to the portions of Couch
which aided its conclusion. Couch also relied on Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Lavoie2 for the proposition that"the Due Process
Clause may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actu-
al bias and who would do their very best to weight the
scales of justice equally between contending parties."
24
Thus, while the court of appeals held here that the due
process standard is more difficult for a petitioner to meet
than the Liteky standard for federal judges, it is clear from
the Aetna decision that a state trial judge may be required
to recuse him or herself even if there has been no showing
of actual bias.
The American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct states that"a judge shall ... act at all times in a man-
ner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary " 25 In the accompanying
Commentary, the Code further states that "a judge must
avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety... .The
test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct
would create in reasonable minds a perception that the
judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired:"6 When
the trial judge in this case stated that in receiving the death
17510 U.S. 540 (1994).
"Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
'p28 U.S.C. § 455 (West 1993). Subsection (a) states:"Any jus-
tice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify him-
self in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned."
20896 E2d 78 (5th Cir. 1990).
21Hill 1997WL 787126 at *2 n.* (citing Couch, 896 E2d at 81).
221d.
-475 U.S. 813 (1986).
24Couch, 896 E2d at 82 (quoting Aetna, 475 U.S. at 825).
2Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 (1990).
2 Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 cmt. (1990).
penalty Hill "got what he deserved;2 7 arguably the trial
judge created "in reasonable minds a perception that the
trial judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with
... impartiality ... [was] impaired72
Though the trial judge's actions created an appearance
of impropriety and thus met the recusal standard used in
Liteky, trial counsel must be careful to note that an appear-
ance of impropriety is not a due process violation.The vast
majority of death penalty litigation originates in the state
courts.Those trial counsel must bear in mind that for state
trial judges, the applicable recusal standard is the Due
Process Clause, not the Liteky appearance standard.
The United States Supreme Court stated in Aetna that
"'most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not
rise to a constitutional level."'29 The proper inquiry is
whether the "situation is one 'which would offer a possible
temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead him not to
hold the balance nice, clear and true.'"3° The Couch court
went on to say that "[tihe Due Process Clause requires a
judge to step aside when a reasonable judge would find it
necessary to do so.""
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Hill alleged four instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Three of the allegations the court dismissed by
invoking "the wide range of reasonable professional assis-
tance" rule of Strickland v. Washington.32 The court found
that none of the three alleged instances of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel fell outside Strickland's wide range, but
rather that they all were potentially strategic trial deci-
sions.
33
The court found no ineffective assistance of counsel
violation based on defense counsel's failure to obtain fur-
ther neuropsychological testing in support of medical testi-
mony when the doctor stated that further testing would not
affect his opinion. The court further found no ineffective
assistance of counsel in the defense counsel's failure to call
as witness a doctor who could have testified about Hill's
personality disorder, when such evidence may have opened
the door to damaging evidence.And finally, the court found
no ineffective assistance of counsel in defense counsel's fail-
ure to call as witnesses doctors to testify about Hill's drug
use pattern, because the testimony would have contradict-
ed other defense evidence.
34
"Hill v.French, No. 97-13,1997WL 787126 at *1 (4th Cir. Dec.
24,1997).
'Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 cmt. (1990).
19Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,820 (1986) (quot-
ing FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948)).
31Id. at 822 (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60
(1972)).
3 United States v. Couch, 896 E2d 78,82 (5th Cir. 1990).
3466 U.S. 668,689 (1984).
33Hill v.French, No. 97-13,1997WL 787126 at *3 (4th Cir. Dec.
24,1997).
mId. at *34.
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Hill's final assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel
rested on defense counsel's decision to forego pursuit of
potentially mitigating evidence of possible child abuse suf-
fered by Hill. Hill argued that defense counsel should have
pursued the evidence despite Hill's own denial of abuse.
The court disagreed, citing again to Strickland: "Counsel's
actions are usually based, quite properly, on ... information
supplied by the defendant .... When a defendant has given
counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investiga-
tions would be fruitless ... , counsel's failure to pursue those
investigations may not later be challenged as unreason-
able"35 Strickland clearly indicates that if such evidence is
35Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
not raised at trial, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
is unlikely to be a successful tool for raising it on appeal.
The message here for trial counsel is that all evidentiary
leads that appear to have a reasonable basis should be inves-
tigated, despite what the defendant himself might say.There
are many potential reasons a defendant might lie about evi-
dence to defense counsel, especially in a situation like Hill's,
wherein the defendant may be embarrassed about the evi-
dence. Mitigation evidence may often be embarrassing to
the defendant, such as child abuse, mental defect or drug
abuse, but it may also be the key to saving the defendant's
life.
Summary and analysis by:
Craig B. Lane
MACKALL v. ANGELONE
131 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On December 18, 1987, Tony Albert Mackall was tried
and convicted in a Virginia state circuit court on charges of
capital murder, robbery, and displaying a firearm in a threat-
ening manner.' His conviction stemmed from the 1986
shooting death of a female service station cashier.2 Before
the trial began, the court denied Mackall's request to ascer-
tain the jurors' perspectives on the death penalty. During
the sentencing phase, the court restricted his introduction
of mitigating evidence.3 Based upon its finding of future
dangerousness, the jury imposed a death sentence upon
Mackall for his commission of the murder, in addition to
sentencing him to life imprisonment for the robbery and
two years' imprisonment for the firearms offense.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his conviction,
and the United States Supreme Court subsequently denied
certiorari. In 1989, Mackall filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in state court. He did not raise a claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel but did assert the following
four claims: a pretrial lineup and an in-court identification
were unnecessarily suggestive; the trial court improperly
refused to allow defense counsel to ask questions of the
venire regarding their views on the death penalty; the trial
court improperly excluded mitigating testimony; and trial
counsel should have been permitted to withdraw due to a
Mackall v. Murray, 109 E3d 957, 958 (1997) [hereinafter
Mackall 1].
'Mackall v.Angelone, 131 E3d 442,444 (4th Cir. 1997) [here-
inafter Mackall fl].
Mackall , 109 E3d at 959.
"id. at 958.
conflict of interest. The court dismissed his petition, and
Mackall did not appeal.5
In 1992, Mackall filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court. The United
States District Court subsequently stayed the federal pro-
ceedings pending Mackall's exhaustion of state court pro-
ceedings, and Mackall filed a second state habeas petition in
1993. In his second state habeas petition, Mackall asserted
that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the
trial level and on direct appeal. The Virginia state circuit
court dismissed Mackall's second petition because he had
not raised the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his
first petition, -which under Virginia Code Section 8.01-
654(B)(2) resulted in a procedural default of these claims.6
Relying upon the Code Section and the procedural default
rule enunciated in Slayton v. Parrigan,7 the Supreme Court
of Virginia denied Mackall's subsequent petition for appeal.8
The United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari.9
Among the claims that Mackall asserted upon returning
to the federal district court were that: 1) in violation of the
Sixth Amendment, he had received constitutionally ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; 2) in viola-
tion of the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments, the trial
court had improperly excluded mitigating evidence; and 3)
in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the
5Mackall I, 131 E3d at 445.
6Id.
7215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974) (holding that issues not
properly raised at trial or on direct appeal are procedurally default-
ed and may not be considered in state habeas).
8Mackall I, 131 E3d at 445.
Mackall, 109 E3d at 959.See Mackall v. Thompson, 513 U.S.
904 (1994).
